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I want to begin with a story, a true story—it happened to a friend of a friend of mine.
Once upon a time there were three women: they were known as ‘the woman in black’, ‘the
grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of humor’ and ‘the rather quiet woman with
the capacity to shock’. These women, who had known each other for quite some time, were
all physicists. They were also friends. As physicists, the woman in black, the grey-haired
woman with the well-developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman with the
capacity to shock had learned, and now shared, ‘a specific vocabulary, grammar and rhetoric’.1
They knew what could count as a scientific observation, ‘what standards of accuracy in
determining observations [were] possible, how the words of common language [were]
restricted and refined for use in [their particular] scientific discipline’.2 They knew how to
tell the ‘truth’. Rational knowledge and empirical evidence were no strangers to these women
who were well versed in what could count as an argument. Consequently, it was said by some
that these women constituted a microcosmic rational community.
However, on weekends, and even once in a while on a weeknight if they were feeling
unusually free from the burdensome pressures that went with the job, the women would
meet in a café, a restaurant, perhaps even a bar. It goes without saying that at these times
empirical evidence, rational statements, and professional standards of accuracy and re-
peatability flew out the window quicker than an uncaged gallah. The woman in black, the
grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman
with the capacity to shock would laugh, weep, bless, tease, gesticulate wildly, curse, break
—
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There are three related points I want to make about tact. First, through the limit marked
by the touch of bodies my body is open and unfinished such that it owes its life to the blood
of others it may now reject as foreign. I have a responsibility (to the life and value of my own
body and those of others) to extend my hand to the other and welcome, with tact, that
difference and the signification it brings. For, to paraphrase Nietzsche, the blood of another
and the signs it gives can only survive if it is re-animated by the touch that it provokes: ‘it is
only our blood that constrains them to speak to us’ and we honour the expressions of other
bodies ‘less by that barren timidity that allows every word … to remain intact than by energetic
endeavours to aid them continually to new life’.38 The body, singular and communal, signifies
and lives through the ‘interlacing, the mixing of bodies with bodies’39 and what this relies on
is treating the other’s uniqueness with tact. Yet, and second, this welcome of the other’s
difference is always conditional in two senses. The welcome is conditional in the sense that,
as the sharing of meaning is two-way or reversible, so is the responsibility for maintaining
the limit and hence the difference between bodies. There is no obligation here to welcome
a body that lacks tact, that already negates my expression of existence, that presents as a hand
that grasps or as a clenched fist. Welcoming the other’s difference is also conditional in the
sense that the way the hand is extended to the other is always accompanied by the sharing
of meaning that provides the horizon of my sense of belonging. I will necessarily exceed the
limit of the other’s body by the touch, through the imposition of social meanings I already
embody and through the transformation of modes of belonging that the sharing of meaning
involves. While the hand extended to the other that it cannot grasp will always therefore
involve a lack of tact, there are cases where it is clear that the limit has been exceeded in its
formation to a point that is intolerable and therefore unacceptable. This brings me to my third
point about tact—the point where the limit between bodies dissolves into symbolic or physical
violence with an attendant dissolution of meaning.
All too easily bodies can lose their sense (and sense lose its bodies) through a lack of tact
of bodies that completely withdraw from or exceed the limit of the other’s touch. ‘Deported,
massacred, tortured’ bodies are examples that Nancy provides.40 To this we might add raped,
imprisoned, abandoned and vilified bodies. Within the act of rape, deportation, or vilification,
and apart from any meaning imposed through the act, such bodies are being deprived of
community and so are being stripped of their ability to signify their uniqueness and be
the unique event of the taking place of meaning. This is also the case with a more general
politics of exclusion. Such a politics would turn the paradox and ambiguity of expression,
the separation and merging of bodies, or the singularity and sharing of meaning ‘into a matter
of exclusion’ where the one practising such a politics seeks to be the singular origin of
meaning.41 In Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, this would be to turn the withdrawal from others
precipitated by a failure of belonging into a policy of denying that the expression of meaning
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY200352
bread and argue until it was time to go their separate ways. They would also gossip about
who was fucking who, or at least who wanted to; who had said what to whom and what that
could possibly mean; who, since they last met, had earned a place on their list of sworn
enemies, or their list of fantasy objects; who had been removed from the aforesaid lists, and
why; what they had recently bought, wanted to buy, or couldn’t afford to buy; what of
late had made them feel good, or bad, or indifferent; the state of the weather, the price
of cigarettes versus the price of nicotine patches; the sorry state of their aging bodies; and
so on and so forth. And in and through this laughing and cursing, gossiping and becoming
inebriated, smiling and weeping, touching and being touched, repeating of commonly held
stock concepts and statements, there formed, some would say, what you might call a non-
serious community.
Now most people, and one rather staid man in particular who went by the name of Martin
Heidegger, were of the opinion that what the woman in black, the grey-haired woman with
the well-developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock
got up to on the weekends was rather banal, that it in fact was the epitome of ‘idle talk’: that
is, a sort of ‘essential erring, [a] wandering’ from one thing to another ‘that picks up the general
lines of things and situations’, that repeats ‘what anyone can see’. In short, their ‘idle talk’
‘consisted of generalities’.3 This ‘idle talk’, declared Martin and his followers (who, in case
you haven’t heard this story before, liked to be known as philosophers), was ‘inauthentic’ and
opposed to the singular, to one’s own (authentic) possibilities for existence: it was nothing
more than the anonymous babble of the rabble, or, as Heidegger put it, the ‘they’.4 But then
what can you expect from a bunch of women, who, try as they might, will never, or so it’s said,
escape from their ontology—and there are those who will go to unbelievable lengths to make
sure that this particular myth is never interrupted.
Now, as you can no doubt imagine, these sorts of accusations didn’t sit well with the woman
in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of humour and the rather quiet
woman with the capacity to shock, all of whom were familiar with morbid Martin’s tendency
to set up hierarchies between those things that begin with capital letters and those that are
more modest. These were not the kind of women who were prepared to accept that they were
simply an anonymous part of the madding crowd—an overly emotional and irrational part
at that! But, nor were they followers of the infamous Jacko, the footy hero whose anthem ‘I’m
an Individual’ outsold, or so I’m told, anything Madonna ever did, and has forever lodged
itself in the sporting consciousness of this sunburnt, but nevertheless lucky, country. In a
nutshell, the woman in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of
humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock knew only too well that they
spoke with the tongues of others, but they also knew that this didn’t simply make them
ventriloquist dummies.
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both singularity and community arise. It is also the limit that marks the moral value of a
singular body and is therefore the source of our ethics. Nancy elsewhere calls this limit
‘absolute skin’.32 That is, the cut that forms and opens the body, that forms the hand extended
to another body, that gets the circulation of blood going, arises from the touching itself. ‘It
is by touching the other that the body is a body’ and it is through this touch that community
takes place as bodies and meaning ‘absolutely separated and shared’.33 Nancy’s use of the term
‘absolute’ here and with reference to ‘skin’ refers to the idea that in the touch, in the limit that
forms bodies as separate and shared, meaning takes place such that the body is (as opposed
to has) meaning, apart from any interpretation of that meaning. Another way he explains this
finitude or absoluteness of the body, reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of singularity, is that
the other’s body signifies another unique access to a world, another source of signification,
that is not me and that I cannot access.34 But, paradoxically, the body is this absolute place
of meaning, only as being exposed to this finitude through others; only through being-touched
(actual and at a distance) is the body the place of inalienable sense and hence unique value.
Another way to put this might be to say that as bodies we are the unique event of the taking
place of meaning and hence of value in itself, but only by ‘exposition’, by a sharing that exposes
this uniqueness and allows its expression. The skin is absolute in the sense that skin marks
the limit by which bodies appear as meaningful and singular/unique as well as shared. But
neither this limit, this skin, nor the unique sense of bodies it expresses come before the touch
of other bodies; the limit between bodies ‘appears’ with the touch. There is not first alterity
detached from bodies and their social expression (as Levinas sometimes implies), but bodies
detaching themselves from the limit of other bodies while remaining attached and exposed.
‘To touch is to be at the limit.’35
It is the ambiguity and undefinability of this limit between bodies that makes the ethics
of community difficult. That the body is the place of unique sense and yet makes sense only
as such and more generally in community suggests that the body’s exposition is inseparable
from its social expression. The world is the ‘exhibition’ of bodies, as Nancy puts it.36 Yet, the
idea that the social world is the body’s exposition is also its risk: there is the risk that a body’s
uniqueness will be deprived of exposition, and therefore that the body will be deprived of
meaning, either through rejection by the bodies of others on the basis of perceived foreignness
or through incorporation by other bodies, an appropriation that would also dissolve the limit.
This dissolution of the limit and therefore of the absolute difference between bodies signifies
the point at which the cut of the touch is too deep or is closed over so that the sharing of
meaning necessary to the social expression of bodies is not sustained. If the contact of skin,
touching and being touched, marks a limit between bodies made singular/unique and shared
through the limit, then touch, as Nancy remarks in passing, is a matter of ‘tact—that is to say,
the right touch’.37
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precipitated by attempts to build or maintain community, as a politics of exclusion does, on
the assumption of commonality and shared values against others who are perceived as foreign.
On the model of community that I have just outlined, what Jean-Luc Nancy would call
‘community without communion’,29 bodies and their social expression are what matters to
both sociality and to what some might call human dignity. It is as bodies that we actualise the
social meaning we inherit, it is as a corporeal mode of belonging to a world that we are unique,
and it is as bodies that we are mortal, finite, and vulnerable. It is this mortality and finitude
(uniqueness) of the body then that makes us ‘human’, social, and therefore moral beings.30
As I suggested earlier, this is why ‘thou shalt not kill’ is arguably such a fundamental moral
value. But, as I also suggested above, it is from the corporeal foundation of finitude and
sociality that our other ‘humanitarian’ principles arise, that is, it is on the basis of the corporeal
foundation of finitude and sociality that we have a responsibility to welcome the bodies of
others without eradicating their uniqueness. In other words, as a body I only get my sense
of mortality and finitude, and hence my uniqueness, from my community with others whose
difference/uniqueness I cannot assimilate; this uniqueness is only signified in community and
community lives from its expression. Attending to the ethics of community involves attending
to both the necessity of extending one’s hand to the other and the necessity of maintaining
the difference or limit between bodies so joined.
Community then, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, is an original sharing and ‘com-pearance’ of
singular (different and finite) beings exposed to each other. These singular beings are not
individual identities that come before this ‘exposition’ in community—singular beings are
finite beings exposed to their finitude through the otherness of others and this exposure is
also exposition, that is, involves the expression and sharing of meaning. Hence:
A singular being does not emerge or rise up against the background of a chaotic, undiffer-
entiated identity of beings, or against the background of their unitary assumption, or
that of becoming, or that of will. A singular being appears, as finitude itself: at the end
(or at the beginning), with the contact of the skin (or the heart) of another singular being,
at the confines of the same singularity that is, as such, always other, always shared, always
exposed …
Community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without another singular
being …
[F]initude co-appears or compears (com-paraît) and can only compear: in this formulation
we would need to hear that finite being always presents itself “together”, hence severally; for
finitude always presents itself in being-in-common and as this being itself.31
This singularity that is also a being-in-common, or sharing that is also a division (partage)
appears at the limit of the contact of skin. This limit of touching my being-touched is where
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Time passed and their shared conviction that they were neither Gods nor lemmings, unique
individuals nor anonymous parts of a seething (and somewhat unseemly) mass, grew stronger
and stronger until one day the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock suggested getting
together with a few other people she knew who also seemed to be stuck on the horns of this
particular dilemma. The woman in black and the grey-haired woman with the well-developed
sense of humour thought that this was a great idea and straight away each of them set to work
thinking about singular ways in which to present their shared conundrum. But it wasn’t too
long before each of the women who were writing and thinking together began to feel that
writing/thinking/being ‘in-common’ might not be such a good thing after all. Each heard their
singular insights lose their singularity as they rolled around and were repeated by the voice
of the other. The trouble was that the woman in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-
developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock could no
longer tell which ideas belonged to whom, whose lips were uttering which words or where
these words originated. To put it rather bluntly each of them felt like a ventriloquist dummy
but none of them could tell whose hand was up whose arse and whether or not they liked
it. What were they to do?
Well, as I said, as well as being good-time girls on the weekend these women had been
well-trained in the language and methods of institutionally legitimised problem-solving—
they were physicists after all! So, after much rational discussion and, of course, the odd bit
of groaning and beating of breasts, the woman in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-
developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock came to
the conclusion that even if each of them were to make the statement ‘A+B=C’ and even if their
friends and colleagues were to interpret the three utterances as a simple repetition of the same
message, this would, in fact, not be the case—particularly given that only one of them had
a strange accent that no one seemed quite able to place, whereas another spoke in a nicotine
timbre punctuated with dry wit and the third barely hid an impishness that infused even the
most serious statement with the possibility of something else. Similarly, the good-time girl
in each of them agreed that even in the unlikely event that they were all to wear the same outfit
(accessories included) to the get-together that the rather quiet woman with the capacity to
shock had organised, they’d be something other than clones, because you don’t have to be
a nuclear physicist to know that no two women look the same in an identical frock, which
is why haute couture remains exclusive to those with more money than sense.
To cut a very long story short each decided that in her own way she would refuse the choice
that others like Martin H. had posited between the authentic and the inauthentic, the indi-
vidual and the mass, and immerse herself instead in the experience of the impossible, of the
limit—a choice not uncommonly made by the heroine of fairytales as well as by the uncon-
ventional woman of science.
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is opened and transformed by the difference that provokes it. My body and existing social
meanings it expresses, including any ‘common pre-history’ I share with the other, are pro-
longed but also surpassed in this community of being-with.27 Something that matters moves
me in its difference, and while I find the words and the actions to respond from the social
horizon within which I dwell, I also find my body, my blood and its meanings, is opened by
and flows toward the other and so is not yet finished. Community, as the sharing of meaning
between bodies, is always inhabited by its undoing, familiarity by strangeness, sense by non-
sense. This sharing of meaning is a two-way process that involves the open unfinished
transformation of bodies and meaning and, most fundamentally, is dependent on maintaining
the divergence between bodies necessary to keep expression going.
What explains a failure of belonging then, when confronted with strangeness (the baseball
caps worn backwards, for example) is not the ungraspable difference between bodies that
community lives from (if there were not this difference I would not feel or in other ways
perceive and express the failure), but a refusal or denial of the ambiguity and unfinished
transformation of meaning that this difference demands. What would explain such a failure
in the expression of meaning, in the first instance, is a clash of styles accompanied by a degree
of habit and sedimentation of meaning that makes it difficult in the short term for me to adjust
to, tolerate, or welcome the strangeness that confronts me. Merleau-Ponty, from his earliest
work, stresses that my freedom to be open to anything at all is necessarily limited by my
pre-history, by the cultural sedimentation of meaning that informs my style of belonging.28
There is nothing inherently wrong or unethical with a retreat into the familiar of this pre-
history where I would reassemble myself accordingly. It happens all the time. (Although this
retreat from others is never complete if I am still alive and if life means anything at all.) What
matters about a failure of belonging is not that we are prone to the experience itself, but the
conditions under which it happens and how one responds. There are situations where with-
drawal from the strangeness of others into the familiar, for instance, would not only be
explicable but also justified: If the strangeness that confronts me already involves a refusal
of the paradox of expression, a strangeness that fixes meaning and is expressed as vilification,
violence, appropriation or some other form of explicit negation of me as a unique expression
of existence. Conversely, the withdrawal from others effected by a failure of belonging because
of a clash of styles or by the perceived possibility of such a failure would be a problem, for
example, if it became a matter of policy, either personal or political. Both cases involve closing
down the difference between bodies from which community lives. It is to the ethics of that
closure that I now turn.
I turn more directly to the ethics that attends this idea that community and its undoing
take place in the ambiguous expression of meaning between bodies in order to address the
suggestion with which I began: that an implosion of meaning and a moral implosion are
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In short, each set off to explore, in her own way and in her own time, what it could possibly
mean to experience community without communion, without commonality; what it could
possibly mean to be inextricably bound up with others and yet at the same time to remain
irreducible to a sort of generalisable state or common-being. Because, you see, each of them
knew, in their hearts and in their bones, that everything that exists ‘co-exists because it exists’,
that the ‘co-implication of existing is the sharing of the world’,5 but this didn’t stop them
stressing about the fact that they couldn’t seem to draw a nice neat line around the thoughts,
the words, the being, which they were becoming less and less sure belonged uniquely to each
of them. The woman in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of
humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock had heard it said that ‘a single
being is a contradiction in terms’, that ‘[b]eing is singularly plural and plurally singular’,6 and
each felt this to be so, even though their attempts to intellectualise the affective dimension
of their being-in-the-world—the simple fact that they were drawn to, moved by, repelled by,
marked by, bound up with, others—seemed to be necessarily obstructed by the rules of
rational thought. And so, despite the lack of a marriage of true minds, a sensational severance
and sworn sedition, or some other such neatly packaged happy ending, this is where my story
ends (but of course, it isn’t really the end of the story since, as you know, there can be no end).
II
It seems to me that in many ways this story encapsulates the tension of being singular–plural,
the generativity and the frustration of being, thinking, writing, ‘with’ that has so concerned
theorists such as Emmanuel Levinas, Alphonso Lingis, Jean-Luc Nancy, Luce Irigaray and even
Martin Heidegger. Let me explain.
As I said, the story that I’ve told is a story of three women: three women who are, in one
sense at least, identifiable (by the colour of their hair, the clothes that they wear, the char-
acteristics that we ascribe to them, the academic positions they hold, the names that adorn
their birth certificates and so on). But in another sense, making an association between a
fairytale figure, or a list of descriptors, and a particular subject doesn’t really enable one to
pin the other down, to circumscribe her, to know her in her entirety (whatever that might
mean), to define where she ends and I begin. In effect then, at the same time that each of these
women might be identifiable, they are also unknowable, at least in any absolute sense: at the
same time that they are singular, they are also in-relation. The other woman is not reducible
to an epistemological object. She is not ‘one’, as Irigaray has so (in)famously noted, and as
a result she isn’t containable within the logic of the ‘one’, which, as we know, nevertheless
continues to tell ‘the same old stories’, to enact ‘the same discussions, the same arguments,
the same scenes. The same … Same … Always the same.’7 What this story, which is not a myth,
seems to suggest, what it makes me feel, is that each of these women is integral to the sense
—
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my opening onto the other, my being-with the other and vice versa, but for him this arises
within the expression of my style of existence through the other’s body.22 It is the body as
expression that signifies its singularity, that is, the body as expression signifies that the other
is a unique mode belonging to the world that is not me. It is being touched by this absolute
difference of the other’s body (actually or at a distance) that opens my body to the circulation
and expression of meaning through the other’s body (and vice versa). This difference not only
inaugurates the expression of my body within an existing social horizon of meaning such that
it and the world it belongs to mean anything at all, but it is also that strangeness that prevents
both my body and the body of the community from being a unity and making complete sense
from the moment of its appearance. Perception (pre-reflective and reflective) and written and
spoken discourse amount to touching this being-touched.23 What we perceive, think or write
is written in our blood, it is an affective expressive offering of our body to the other whose
absolute difference (uniqueness) inspires and moves us. But both I and the other bring to this
encounter styles of existence that express culturally sedimented meanings which will effect
degrees of familiarity and surprise depending on how much history we have in common.
Whatever the degree of shared cultural background or common pre-history, touching my
being-touched involves the sharing of meaning. In that blood donation the skin that holds
our self-possession is broken; we cannot easily tell the difference between what touches and
what is touched, what is me and not me, what meaning comes from me and what comes from
the other. At the same time, while a sense of belonging to a world thus involves bodies
inhabiting each other with an attendant sharing of meaning, the singularity or difference
between me and the other, between the touching and being-touched, must be maintained for
perception or the expression of meaning to take place at all. Merleau-Ponty calls this the
‘paradox of expression’ and the ‘divergence of flesh’—the separation and merging of bodies
as expression necessary for the expression of meaning that is community as being-with.24
This paradox of expression means that the ‘other is never present face to face’,25 either in
the communitarian sense of mutual recognition or in Levinas’s sense of an originary exposure
to the other’s alterity prior to the social expression of bodies—between my body and the
other’s, between the touching and being-touched, is always the ‘thickness of flesh’, the
difference between bodies that opens within and animates social expression.26 It is because
of this paradox that I can never grasp the other’s difference or the social meanings that are
expressed in my belonging. Further, the paradox of expression is such that the body and its
expression is real-ised ambiguously and unfinished in this writing of community between the
touching and being touched. So, while the expression of my body is informed by culturally
sedimented meanings and is lived as a sense of belonging, because perception and its verbal
or written expression is animated by being-touched by another body (by the difference of the
matter at hand that touches me), then the meaning of what I write in my blood in response
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of self, the bodily being-in-the-world of the others, and yet, these women are not reducible
to a single being or to an anonymous mass. Ultimately, ‘one cannot be distinguished from the
other; which does not mean that they are indistinct’.8
When they speak to one another, whether of (meta)physics or fucking, whether rationally
or nonsensically, the women repeat the words, the gestures, the concepts, the taxonomies of
their social world because ‘no conversation starts from zero’. Whenever they speak they speak
‘with’, whenever they think they think ‘with’, whenever they write they write ‘with’. But this
does not mean to say that these women, their thoughts, their writings, are simply inter-
changeable or that their ‘exchanges’ are transactions. Rather, each ‘one’ is singular (which isn’t
the same as saying that each ‘one’ is an individual) while simultaneously being in-relation.
Singularity, in the sense that I, following Nancy, am using it here, does not refer to something
that I can define, but rather to ‘what can only remain untheorizable, yet which demands to
be thought’.9
Nevertheless, these women are constantly called forth to speak for themselves, as them-
selves, to author works that are signed with a single name and to be answerable for the
thoughts these works are assumed to contain. As Alphonso Lingis explains in a paper entitled
‘Cues, Watchwords, Passwords’, ‘this standing forth as a subject, as one who speaks in [her]
own name, occurs when it is called forth by juridic or quasi-juridic acts which assign to
individuals the right to speak ... When one speaks in one’s own name, it is because one has
a duty to speak’.10 But while this call, this duty, to speak as oneself can and does inscribe the
embodied subject as an ‘individual’, an autonomous being who is (thought to be) the origin
of actions, words, thoughts, and is thus able to be held responsible and accountable for them,
this is not all there is to the story. What I want to suggest is that this calling forth is not
something that is simply imposed from the outside onto a self-contained and fully formed
individual, who must then choose whether or not to respond. I do not simply speak, write,
think, because the law demands that I do. We do not (and let’s not) simply lay down the law
to each other, nor simply respond to its demands by ‘speaking well’. Our words, which are
never ours alone, are always already ‘appeals to move, to be moved, together’.11
What each of the women in the story felt, in their hearts and in their bones and in their
blood, was that she was somehow different from and yet inextricably bound to others. Each
felt that her ‘self’ was engendered, or ‘inspired’ as Emannuel Levinas puts it, in and through
alterity, in and through the encounter(s) with, and exposure(s) to, the Other(ness) that would
forever elude her, and yet, was never entirely external to her: each had the other in her skin.12
‘I carry you with me everywhere. Not like a child, a burden, a weight. I do not contain you
or retain you in my stomach, my arms, my head. Nor in my memory, my mind, my language.
You are there, like my skin.’13 Each was marked, as you are too dear reader, as all subjects are.
Or to put it otherwise, you could say that self and other are mutually constitutive and
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alterity may inspire) touches me, affects me, cuts me, and opens me to the other and to the
world. This is the ungraspable difference that is the condition of community, of being-with.
The individual does not come before this sociality. Rather, the other’s alterity is the condition
of my unique identity and subjectivity: I am this unique exposure to, welcome of, and giving
to the other whom I cannot know. This relation to alterity, the hand extended to the other,
is corporeal and affective: it is the strangeness of others that I feel, rather than anything that
I recognise, judge, or understand, that moves me to act and speak in the first place and, so,
opens me to the other. And this affective response to the other is also where both signification
and ethics originate. The other’s ‘absolute’ otherness signifies (through the face and, as Levinas
sometimes admits, the whole of the body) a ‘unique sense’ that inaugurates and situates
meaning.18 That is, the other’s otherness signifies their unique value (apart from and before
the assignment of any cultural meaning to this difference), by signifying their absolute
difference to me as a site of expression and hence their vulnerability and resistance to my
projects and judgments. This expression of uniqueness or ‘signifyingness of the face’ thereby
puts existence on a human and moral plane; it says ‘thou shalt not kill’ and this unique sense
introduces value and meaning into existence by also soliciting my response through discourse
(I speak and give to the other rather than kill or possess). My cultural expression, including
the hand extended to the other, would not arise at all, says Levinas, without this orientation
towards the absolute otherness or unique sense of the other ‘whose presence is already
required for my cultural gesture of expression to be produced’.19 So, through this affective
and ethical relation to alterity, my self-possession is cut open in a way that not only makes
me responsible for the other who moves me, but also opens me to the other through discourse
whereby I offer the gift of a common world.
Not only is the community of being-with initiated and maintained by this unique sense
or absolute difference, but so are our humanitarian and egalitarian principles. It is a principle
of existence (and not a peculiarity of a select group of culturally specific modes of belonging)
that we would preserve the other’s unique sense by building a meaningful world in which it
would better survive rather than negating or killing it off. It is on this basis that Levinas claims
that the ethical relation (the hand extended to the other who it cannot grasp) orientates politics
toward justice.20 What he does not address adequately is the reverse relation, how existing
modes of belonging (including their intercorporeal basis) and the social horizons of meaning
they express may already inform this ethical relation to difference from which community
lives.
While Levinas sometimes suggests otherwise, the alterity or unique sense that initiates and
maintains community is not detached from the expressive bodies that it links and animates,
or from the history, politics, and horizon of social meaning within which these bodies dwell.21
Merleau-Ponty, for instance, also notes a unique sense (what he calls ‘singularity’) that animates
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simultaneously incommensurable: one cannot exist without the other, but nor are the two
(which are never ‘two’) reducible to one another. In and through exposure, in touching, in
being touched, ‘one’ encounters that which it cannot encounter: that is, alterity, the limit. ‘[I]t
comes upon that which it cannot touch, and thereby it touches itself ... it feels itself (powerless)
there where it touches (tangentially) what it cannot attain’.14
Thus being-with is a matter of tact in all senses of the word. And perhaps, following
Nancy, we can say that this is also the case with thinking, with writing, that these too are
matters of tact, of touching and being touched, moving and being moved, calls from/to, and
responses to, the other: that being, thinking, writing, are sites of exposure, of becoming and
unbecoming-with. If we return to the three women for a moment what is apparent is that each
was/is moved, touched, inspired, angered, comforted, called forth, by the thoughts, the words,
the very being-there of the others. And these thoughts, these words, bore the trace of other
encounters, other exposures, other touches, not only too numerous to mention but never
present, although, of course, never absent either. Touch, as Zsuzsa Baross puts it, is ‘the
in-between par excellence’ since ‘to touch another may be in one’s power ... but it is not anyone’s
property; always shared in-between … touch is never mine or mine alone. … Touch is always
already reciprocal, returned simultaneously, in the same instant’.15 And insofar as being,
thinking, writing, could be said to be matters of tact, they have at their heart the ‘with’ that
the three women experienced as at once generative and limiting.
III
I want now to say something more about the story with which this paper began. In a sense
the story could be read or heard as a myth, that is, as a narrative that functions to gather
together people and ideas. In myth, as Nancy puts it, ‘the world makes itself known, and it
makes itself known through declaration … Myth is very precisely the incantation that gives
rise to a world and brings forth a language, that gives rise to a world in the advent of a
language.’16 Myth, then, is always the myth of community and of communion, of being-in-
common, and of becoming one in and through knowledge (of one’s self, of others and of the
world, the being, we share). But I want to suggest that there is another way to think about
the story with which this paper opened and, in particular, to (re)imagine the ways in which
it could be said to function.
Rather than according the story the status of myth as that which constitutes origins and
knowledge, I want to think about it as a writing, a sharing that moves to the tune of something
other than a functional logics. I want to suggest that this is not so much a story about sharing,
but rather a story as sharing: it constitutes an enactment rather than an illustration of the ‘with’
which ‘as such is not presentable’.17 As Nancy notes in a discussion of sharing:
—
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In claiming that community lives on difference expressed in the relation of being-with other
bodies that I cannot assimilate, I do not mean what Iris Marion Young has described as a
‘community of strangers’ under the label of a postmodern politics of difference. Young, in an
early but groundbreaking and influential discussion of community based on commonality
versus a politics of difference defines the latter as ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’.13
I have no quarrel with this definition. But in articulating what she means she describes her
ideal of a city of strangers, which exhibits ‘temporal and spatial distancing and differentiation’
characterised by endless unique spaces and populated by strangers who are ‘externally related.
[These strangers] experience each other as other, different, from different groups, histories,
professions, cultures, which they do not understand’.14 The attraction of such a city for Young
is the diversity of spaces, subcultures, and activities that one can enjoy with anonymity and
without imposing one’s values on others, as if I could touch the surface in passing while
remaining untouched. While this idea of diversity, externality, and anonymity is what also
appeals to me about the city, I doubt this could be enjoyed if it did not already mean some-
thing to me, if I had not already been touched by others, if I did not already have the benefit
of the sense of belonging that I described before. This familiarity that comes from the habit
of dwelling with others, and the being-touched that this involves, would therefore also be in
operation in the apparent anonymity of dwelling with strangers that Young describes. For
Young it is as if difference is already constituted and contained within unique meaningful
capsules for me to touch or not, understand or not, accept or reject at will. This difference
is not what I mean when I say that community lives from difference. The difference community
lives from is not subject to choice and does not leave me or the other untouched. Nor do I
mean that identity, communal or individual, is multifaceted in the sense of being the product
of intersections with many different modes of being. As the above discussion of belonging
indicates, identity is ‘intersectional’ or ‘hybrid’ in the sense that my habitual ways of expressing
and patterning existence do arise from dwelling with different kinds of bodies, from having
feet and hands in many different communities which differ on the basis of sex, race, sexuality
etc. such that, as Chantal Mouffe puts it, identity arises from ‘intricate links between many
forms of identity and a complex network of differences’.15 But the difference that identity and
community live from is not difference understood as already meaningful characteristics that
intersect across my body and come to settle upon and in it such that I am ‘contaminated by
this otherness’.16 This intercorporeal or shared belonging is relevant to the difference com-
munity lives from and I will return to address the connection between them.
The difference community lives from is the other’s difference that I cannot grasp but that
initiates my movement towards the other and towards the world. Levinas, for example, puts
this difference in terms of the other’s alterity that ‘initiates the handshake’ of sociality.17 The
other’s alterity (apart from any particular expression or interpretation of difference that this
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One cannot tell its story [that is, the story of sharing], nor determine its essence: there is no
myth of it, nor is there a philosophy of it. But it is [writing] that does the sharing. It does
it, or is it, precisely to the extent that it interrupts myth.18
What Nancy means by this is that community, as it is conventionally understood, consists
of a project, a communion, a coming together, a merging with others like oneself and that
community negates or covers over the generativity, the unpredictability, the essentially open-
endedness, the alterity, of sharing. Community fixes things, ideas, essences, identities: it
‘imprison[s] us in enclosed spaces where we cannot keep on moving’.19 In effect, community
inaugurates the closure of the art of being-with, or of the political as Nancy sometimes calls
it.20 Community, in this sense, reduces the three women of whom I spoke earlier to exchange-
able pawns in a game of oneness, to a list of shared characteristics or shared occupations, by
which we can name them and know them, so that despite the fact that these three women
never wear the same frocks to the same functions, they are nevertheless clones: end of story.
Same old story. There is no sharing, since there is nothing to share.
But, as we’ve seen, the text that recounts its own story recounts an unfinished story, a story
that cannot be finished since it is always already inscribed with the trace of the other, of ‘what
is inordinate’;21 it essentially interrupts its own telling. The telling of the story with which
this paper began may have, in one sense, brought us together,22 it may have consisted of a
reiteration of shared concepts, grammar, and so on, but at the same time, the story constituted,
I would argue, a sharing which touched each of you in different ways and took each of you
on different journeys.23 We may understand ourselves and the world by sharing this story,
but what the relations between the three women, and our own encounters with these women
and the relations between them, shows is ‘that sharing does not constitute an understanding
(or a concept … or a schema), that it does not constitute a knowledge, and that it gives no-
one … mastery over being-in-common’.24 Thus we find ourselves not so much in the mythic
scene of community, but at its edges, at the limit where myth is interrupted by a writing-with
that is sharing, that opens up rather than forecloses community.
To return to the story: sharing, then, is not something that three always already constituted
women do, ‘but an experience that makes them be’.25 ‘[I]t is not the case that the “with” is
an addition to some prior Being; instead, the “with” is at the heart of Being’.26 In other words,
these three women did not simply pass on bits of knowledge, thoughts, writings, to one
another when they were feeling generous, or withhold bits of knowledge, thoughts, writings,
when they weren’t. Rather, they were (and continue to be) constituted in and through sharing,
touching, thinking, writing: it is through others, because of others, with others, that they/I
exist, that they/I think, that they/I write, and if they/I do sometimes withhold ideas and so
on, this is what you might call a second-degree response.
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through words that shame with timbre and tone; or affirm with a pat on the back. And this
incarnation and expression of social meaning is ambiguous and open to transformation for
reasons I will address.12
It is because the body expresses existence and meaning as it actualises existence and
meaning that it is so hard to locate the meanings and values that drive us and that we assume
we share with others. This meaning exists most fundamentally through the bodies that express
it through other bodies. This is not to deny that social meanings and values have institutional
support through written laws and principles (of democracy, justice, equality etc.). But here
too these principles and laws are expressed and actualised through the bodies that write,
govern, enact, monitor, and interpret the law. That meaning is actualised and expressed by
a body through other bodies is why I can only grasp a sense of belonging to one or several
communities, and then only in passing, not by pointing to a table of ideas, but as I live these
ideas with and in relation to other bodies; and then I only grasp these most explicitly in
retrospect when I feel a failure of belonging with others: when I find my local cinema invaded
one day by a group of blokes with baseball caps worn backwards, or when I am passed over
for service in favour of a younger person, or if I were refused entry on the basis of sex or the
colour of my skin. That meaning is expressed and actualised through bodies is one reason
why a politics of exclusion, such as that being practised by the Australian and other conserva-
tive democratic governments, tends to be internally divisive and destructive: as values and
meanings do not exist apart from their expression through bodies, then no one actually lives
up to those abstract values alone in practice and they can only be articulated by pointing to
instances where they supposedly fail—in those others we would exclude from our community
ahead of any contact on the basis of what is perceived as foreign in terms of values thought
to adhere to race, class, sexuality, country of origin, religion (in drowning asylum seekers,
in radical homosexual high court judges, in lesbians who use IVF, in the unemployed, to name
a few targets of the politics of exclusion practised by members of the current Australian
Government). The problem with justifying a politics of exclusion with reference to ideas and
values supposedly shared by our community but abstracted from their expression through
bodies is that such ideas necessarily exclude every actual body to eventually leave a community
of one. But, related to this point and more central to my purposes, it is because the body
expresses meaning as it actualises existence, only with and through other bodies that are
different to mine, that identity and community are internally multifaceted, fragile and open,
rather than unified, secured by commonality, and completed. It is paradoxically difference
expressed in the relation of being-with other bodies, rather than commonality, that drives
community and its sense of belonging. Community lives on difference, on the touch of
difference of other bodies that cannot be assimilated to mine. I want to dwell on this point
for a while, beginning with what I do not mean.
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Sharing, in this sense, could be thought of as an unworking of community, an unworking
of myth, an unworking of identity. But this unworking, I would argue, is not simply the
destruction of necessary certainties, nor is it just a postmodern game that ultimately achieves
very little outside the ivory tower of the academy. This unworking, as Linnell Secomb has
suggested in a paper entitled ‘Fractured Community’, is the refusal of unity, of totalising logic
and of the violence endemic to such logic.27 It destabilises the logic of the ‘one’ in and through
the invocation of alterity, ambiguity, the ‘not-one’, différence perhaps. What’s more, the
recognition of this unworking enables the notion of a being-together that is not a togetherness
and that does not annihilate difference nor presume difference to be articulable, calculable,
predictable, fixed, something I can list: a being-together that is not a community of individuals,
but a being-with founded in and through alterity. So while we can’t ever rid ourselves of the
spectre of murder, it no longer looms large on the horizon: it is ‘death as the operative
negativity of the One’ that has been (mortally?) wounded.28
I want to conclude by returning to the three women, the physicists who are less interested
in Grand Unifying Theories than they are in those remarkable black holes which are formed,
or so I’m told, when a star collapses under its own weight and which are discernable only in
and through their invisibility.
So, there we sat, the three of us, in bars, cafés, each other’s lounge rooms, talking, laughing,
brainstorming, arguing, touching and being touched. And what we knew in our hearts, our
bones, our blood, our very flesh, but what we would sometimes forget being human, all too
human, is that this ‘“we” is not the adding together or juxtaposition of [unique and discrete]
“I’s”’,29 a ‘we’ ‘is the condition for the possibility of each “I”’;30 and thus, as Nancy has noted,
the ‘with’ of our being, our thinking, our writing, is better expressed in terms of identifications,
than in terms of identities. Our being, thinking, writing ‘with’ is a gift that none of us has given,
a gift we cannot afford to forget.
This story is not a myth, but a writing on the limit. You can always make a myth out of it
again, but there’s no doubt that it’ll be interrupted.
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community, is one reason that it has been charged with ethnocentrism.7 It is this idea of
community built upon commonality behind a wall that would keep strangers out that
overlooks the link between the body, alterity, and the expression of meaning in the formation
of community.
Questioning the centrality of commonality as the basis of community, which is part of the
aim here, is not to deny the importance of community understood as a sense of belonging
and the being-with others upon which it is based. Indeed I would argue, against some
postmodern models of dispersed identity, that no one lives without a sense of belonging—
that pre-reflective sense of having a world with others that allows me to carry on without
thinking. Nothing makes me feel more at home than a shared joke, a familiar taste, shared
outrage at Howard’s latest bit of social policy, and music that has a beat that I can dance to.
And in case that suggests that community, as a sense of belonging, belongs only to the privi-
leged, Catherine Robinson argues that it also belongs to the homeless, although in that case
familiarity would be built through the sharing of strategies to avoid surveillance and violence,
perhaps the sharing of needles, and the unreflected certainty of finding the same soup van
on the same corner in the evening.8 Phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger
in his early work would say that this sense of belonging arises from being-with others within
a horizon of social meaning that makes the pre-reflective perception of others and the world
possible. But, against communitarianism, the idea that I dwell with others within an already
socially significant world is not the same as saying that I can isolate and point to those
meanings and values that inform my sense of belonging, or my perception, or that I hold these
values in common with others absolutely. This sense of belonging is located not in a table of
shared values that I hold in my mind, that I can list off at will, or that I use to identify with
or recognise in others; rather, this familiarity is located in my body as an atmosphere that
informs my perception of the world and of others. For Merleau-Ponty, for example, meaning
is inherited, incarnated, and expressed pre-reflectively such that every body is a style of being,
a signifying and signified expression of comportment toward a world.9 Or, as Nietzsche puts
it, a person has ‘selected and breathed life into their means of expression, not by chance but
of necessity, in accordance with [their] morality’.10 This morality (meaning and the moral
values it may carry) takes hold of me, as Moira Gatens argues, through imaginary bodies,
through the construction of various forms of subjectivity by social ideas about bodies and their
relations.11 Hence, my style of being, which is also a mode of expression, is informed by
culturally sedimented meaning. But this morality does not breathe life into my mode of
dwelling in the form of abstract ideas that I accept or reject through acts of conscious judgment
or that capture the whole of my being. Rather this meaning comes to me and is incarnated
through habituated dwelling with others, in incarnated fragments from the bodies of others;
through gestures that condemn with the curl of a lip or affirm with a wink and a smile; or
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